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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the state of labour protection in four countries (UK, USA, France and 
Germany) during 1970-2006. It supports the contention of the legal-origin theory that UK and 
USA (common law countries) intervene less in the labour market and grant less protection to 
labourers. It also supports the proposition that the problem of unemployment is more acute in 
the civil law countries (France and Germany). But it finds no direct relationship between 
various aspects of labour regulation and unemployment rate. Hence, we conclude that the 
explanation of more acute unemployment problem in France and Germany should be sought 
elsewhere. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth, ‘LLSV’, 1997, 
1998) and the subsequent works by them and their followers (see La Porta et al., 1999, 2000; 
2006, 2008; Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b; 
Botero et al., 2004) strongly supported the idea that law matters for a proper capitalist 
development.  This idea can be traced back to the writings of famous German social scientist, 
Max Weber.  Comparing the experience of industrialising countries of Western Europe with 
other countries Weber concluded that a rational legal system is a precondition for the 
emergence of capitalism. North (1990) had a similar viewpoint. He argued that rich nations 
have managed to form proper institutions that protect property rights and enforcement 
contracts while poor countries lack these institutions and so fail to develop. Some legal 
scholars call it ‘endowment perspective’ of law because it treats legal system as an 
endowment which determines the path of development ‘without itself being subject to change’ 
(for details see Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008, pp.18-22).  
 
La Porta and his collaborators set in motion a series of systematic analysis of the 
relationships between legal and economic variables.  Legal variables (‘leximetric’ data) are 
by and large binary variables (0, 1) used to quantify the quality of various types of law that 
exist in different countries to protect the interests of various stakeholders such as 
shareholders, creditors and labourers. The countries are classified according to their ‘legal 
origin’: English common law and civil law are two broad categories. The civil law systems 
are further sub-divided into those of French, German and Scandinavian origin. Through 
various cross-section regression studies of these ‘leximetric’ data, it is argued that English 
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common law systems are more market-friendly; they provide higher level of shareholder and 
creditor protection to promote financial development. It is also pointed out that the civil law 
countries interfere more in the labour market which exerts a negative impact on employment 
and productivity.   
 
A similar viewpoint can be found in IMF (2003). The IMF called for the deregulation of 
European labour markets and argued that reforms intended to bring European labour laws 
into lines with those of the US would cut unemployment by over a third. The OECD has 
maintained the view that the deregulatory approach of its 1994 Jobs Strategy (OECD, 1994) 
retains ‘plausibility’ (OECD, 2004: 165).  The World Bank’s Doing Business Report stated 
that ‘laws created to protect workers often hurt them’ and that ‘more flexible labour 
regulations boost job creation’ (World Bank, 2008: 19).   
 
In this perspective, we shall study labour law and its unemployment consequence on the basis 
of a new dataset available from the source of Centre for Business Research, CBR (University 
of Cambridge, UK) for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over a long 
time span 1970-2006.1  In the next section we shall discuss the changing pattern of the 
various aspects of labour regulation in these countries over the whole period (1970-2006) for 
which the CBR data are available. In Section 3 we shall discuss the short-term and long-term 
relationship between various aspects of labour regulation and unemployment through 
dynamic panel data modelling.  Section 4 provides the summary and conclusion. 
                                                            
1
  CBR data over a long time span, 1970-2006 are available for five countries: four OECD 
countries covered in this paper and India.  
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2. Labour Protection in Four OECD Countries 
 
The CBR index for labour regulation contains 40 basic variables, which are aggregated into 
five areas: alternative employment contracts (AC), regulation of working time (RT), 
regulation of dismissal (RD), employee representation (ER) and industrial action (IA).   
 
(a) Alternative Employment Contracts (AC): It measures the cost of using 
alternatives to the ‘standard’ employment contract.  One important variable is 
whether fixed-term contracts are allowed only for work of limited duration. The 
maximum score is one (1); it is given if the law imposes a substantive constraint on 
the conclusion of a fixed-term contract, by, for example, allowing temporary hiring 
only for jobs which are temporary by nature, training, seasonal work, replacement 
of workers on maternity or sick leave, or other specified reasons. 
 
(b) Regulation of Working Time (RT): It measures regulation of working time 
covering among other things, duration of the normal working week, annual leave 
entitlements, public holiday entitlements, overtime premium. 
 
(c)  Regulation of Dismissal (RD): It covers among other things legally 
mandated notice period, legally mandated redundancy compensation, minimum 
qualifying period of service for normal case of unjust dismissal.  
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(d) Employee Representation (ER):  It measures the protection of the right to 
form trade unions, which covers among other things the right to collective 
bargaining and codetermination of board membership.  
 
(e) Industrial Action (IA): It measures the strength of protections for industrial action, 
covering matters such as unofficial industrial action (‘wildcat’ strikes), political industrial 
action, lockouts etc.  
 
In Table 1, we have presented the quinquennial average labour protection indices: the 
aggregate series, ALLAB and its five constituent sub-categories such as alternative 
employment contracts (AC), regulation of working time (RT), regulation of dismissal (RD), 
employee representation (ER) and industrial action (IA) for the four countries under study 
(the indices are simple averages of all the relevant variables - the range of values varying 
between 0 and 1).  Through simple averaging, we have also calculated the quinquennial 
average labour protection of the common law group (UK and USA) and the civil law group 
(France and Germany). All these are plotted in a number of diagrams (Figures 1 to 12). These 
show that France protects the interest of their labour more than any other countries studied 
here. France was followed by Germany, UK and USA. The aggregate labour protection index 
of France showed a tendency to rise while that of Germany and USA was stagnant.  In UK 
the change of regime had its repercussion on labour protection: in the 1980s and the early 
1990s labour protection index shows a decline under the successive Conservative 
governments and a subsequent increase under the Labour government. 
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In most of the sub-periods (constituting the period under study, 1970-2006), France provided 
the maximum labour protection in all the sub-categories, excepting one. Labour law relating 
to employee representation (ER) is only one area where Germany led and France followed. In 
Britain, the Conservative government targeted three sub-categories where less and less 
protection was granted to labour: regulation of working time (RT), employee representation 
(ER) and industrial action (IA). However, in the sphere of employment contract (EC), the 
opposite trend can be observed, while the regulation of dismissal (RD) was kept intact. The 
US government targeted only one aspect of labour protection (while keeping all other aspects 
unchanged at very low levels) - this is the regulation of dismissal (RD) which experienced a 
number of improvements during 1980-1994.    
 
From the foregoing analysis of labour regulation, it is clear that in the sphere of labour 
protection the LLSV legal-origin story holds some water. Undoubtedly, UK and USA 
(common law countries) intervene less in the labour market and grant less protection to 
labourers from their employers.  
  
3. Does Protection of Labour Create Unemployment Problem? 
 
In this section, we shall examine the following two related propositions: 
A. The problem of unemployment is more acute in the civil law countries (France and 
Germany). 
B.  This unemployment problem has a direct connection with labour regulation.  
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To examine the propositions we have considered three unemployment variables: 
1. Rate of unemployment as percentage of civilian labour force (TU).  
2. Long-term unemployment (more than one year) as percentage of total unemployment, LU; 
3. Youth unemployment as percentage of total labour force in the age group 15-24, YU. 
The data on long-term unemployment, LU and total unemployment, TU are collected from 
OECD iLibrary. The period of coverage is 1970-2006. Youth unemployment data are 
collected from the World Development Indicators of World Bank; these data are available for 
a shorter period, 1980-2006. 
 
The periodic (mostly quinquennial) averages of the various indicators of unemployment are 
plotted in Figures 13 to 15.  These show that total unemployment rate (TU) rose steadily in 
France and Germany while in the case of UK and USA it showed a declining trend since the 
early 1980s. As regards the long-term unemployment rate (LU), it increased at a slow but 
steady rate in USA while it showed a steady decline in the UK. For the two civil-law 
countries, it showed no clear pattern: a rise in the 1980s and the subsequent ups and downs. 
The rate of youth unemployment, however, showed a steady decline in the UK and USA 
while it exhibited a steady rising trend in France and Germany.  
 
To examine the proposition that the problem of unemployment is more acute in the civil law 
countries (France and Germany) at a more rigorous level, we have considered a panel dataset 
of annual observations for each country. We use the dummy variable for common law origin 
countries (COM) and fit the following regression with a time-trend: 
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(1)    Y =   a + b.COM + c.t 
 
where Y = the  unemployment rate (LU, TU or YU), COM  is the dummy variable = 1 for 
common law countries (UK, USA) and zero for other countries (France and Germany) and t 
is the time-trend. 
 
The estimates are presented in Table 2. These show that the common-law countries tend to 
have significantly low long-term and youth unemployment rates (LU and YU). For the total 
unemployment rate, we have the similar observation although it does not survive the test of 
significance.  
 
Now the crucial question is how far the higher unemployment in the civil-law group is due to 
increasing protection of the interest of labour. We shall seek an answer to this question on the 
basis of panel causality tests; more specifically we shall examine the causal relationship 
between various components of labour regulation index and different indicators of 
unemployment. 
 
To control for the level of economic activity of a country we shall consider real GDP in 
purchasing power parity constant dollars, deflated by population, PPPCY. From the World 
Development Indicators of World Bank we get the data on PPPCY for the period 1975-2006. 
So our period of analysis is 1975-2006 for TU and LU and 1980-2006 for YU. 
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Tests of Panel Unit Roots and Causality 
 
To ascertain the stationarity property of the series (whether a temporary shock has a 
permanent effect) we have used a battery of panel unit root tests based on alternative 
assumptions. These tests do not provide a unique answer to the question of mean stationarity 
or trend stationarity of the series. However, there is a unananimous verdict that all the series 
are first-difference stationary – they are I (1) variables – integrated of order one.  
 
Next, consider the tests of causality. To understand whether the direction of causality is from 
labour protection (Z) to unemployment (X) or the opposite or both (mutual causation) we 
shall use panel VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) Granger causality test. To ascertain whether Z 
causes X, we fit a regression where X the alternative rates of unemployment (taken one at a 
time) is a function of its past values and past values of Y (GDP per capita, PPPCY in natural 
log) and Z (various labour protection indexes taken one at a time): 
 
                        p                 q                   r 
(2)   Xit = α + Σλj Xi, t-j + Σψ k Y i, t-k + Σpil Zi, t-l   +  εit                
                       j =1             k = 1              l=1 
 
 
Fitting the above equation one has to test whether the coefficients of the lags of Z are jointly 
significant (different from zero) through the Wald-test statistic. The null hypothesis is 
  
pi1= pi2 
=…. =
 
pik = 0.  If the Wald test statistic calculated on the basis of this null hypothesis is very 
high (higher than a critical value), we can say that Z causes X (rejecting the null hypothesis 
of no causality). 
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Similarly to test whether X causes Z we fit a regression where Z is a function of its past 
values and the past values of X and Y and test the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
lags of X.   
 
For the choice of lag (how many years past are to be included in our causality test) 
we have considered a number of criteria such as sequential modified LR test 
statistic (LRM), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information 
criterion(AIC),Schwarz information criterion (SC), Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ).  Different criteria often choose different lag lengths and we 
have considered the maximum  lag length.  In view of possible integration of 
the series (as observed in the panel unit root tests), we have added one extra lag (as 
suggested by Toda and Yamamoto, 1995).       
 
Our analysis shows that there is no causal relationship between aggregate labour law index or 
any of its five components and total or long-term unemployment. However, there is a causal 
influence of the aggregate labour protection on youth unemployment rate. Excepting one 
component (which is regulation of working time, RT) all the components of the aggregate 
labour law index show this causal influence. 
 
This calls for further investigation regarding the nature of the influence exerted by labour 
protection on youth unemployment. We shall  use alternative dynamic panel data models. 
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Estimates of Short run and Long-run Relationships 
 
In our causality test we have assumed that an identical relationship prevails in each country; 
this assumption is reflected in our symbols for the estimated parameters, λj, ψk and pil (there is 
no subscript i, which takes into, account the fact that the parameters may differ from country 
to country). Now we shall use the subscript i to start with the assumption that the parameters 
can differ from country to country.   
 
For a large time dimension of panel data (as we have here), Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
showed that the traditional procedures for estimation of pooled models, such as the fixed 
effects, instrumental variables, and generalized method of moments (GMM) ‘can produce 
inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates of the average values of the 
parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope coefficients are in fact identical 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.622).  Therefore, to ascertain the nature of the relationships 
between  labour regulation and youth unemployment we shall use the Pesaran-Shin dynamic 
panel data analysis. 
 
We start with a postulate of long-run relationship involving X (the youth unemployment rate, 
YU), Y (per capita GDP, PPPCY in natural log) and Z (labour protection index): 
 
(3)   Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
 
where i (=1,2,3,4) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents periods (years), ψi and pii   
are the long-run parameters and  ηit is the error term. 
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We are interested to know whether there exist long-term and short-term effects of  Z (labour 
protection) along with Y (per capita GDP measuring economic activities) on X (youth 
unemployment rate) and whether there exists a stable adjustment path from the short-term 
relationship (if any) to the long-run relationship.   
                                                                           
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), our panel data analysis is based on the following error 
correction representation: 
 
                                            p-1              q-1                  r-1       
(4) ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiil ∆Zi, t-l + µ +  φit                
                                     j =1               k = 0              l=0 
 
  
where Δ is the difference operator, θi is the group-specific error-correcting speed of adjustment term, 
λij, ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µ  is the common fixed effect  and φit is the 
disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment 
dynamics requires θi < 0. 
 
Under this general structure, we can have three alternative models. On one extreme, we can 
have dynamic fixed effect estimators (DFE) where intercepts are allowed to vary across the 
groups and all other parameters and error variances are constrained to be the same. At the 
other extreme, one can estimate separate equations for each group and calculate the mean of 
the estimates to get a glimpse of the over-all picture. This is called mean group estimator 
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(MG). Pesaran and Smith (1995) showed that MG gives consistent estimates of the averages 
of parameters. The intermediate alternative is pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999). It allows intercepts, short-run coefficients and error 
variances to differ freely across the groups but the long run coefficients are constrained to be 
the same; that means, ψi =  ψ and  pii = pi for all i while θi may differ from group to group.  
 
Using the STATA ado developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) we have estimated all the three 
alternative models, MG, PMG and DFE. Based on Lag Exclusion Wald Test for each variable 
separately we have determined the lag structure (p, q, r).2    
 
In none of the three models, we find a significant short-term relationship between aggregate 
labour protection, ALLAB or its various components and youth unemployment rate (Table 
4).  In many cases we find significant negative  long-term relationships but without a stable 
adjustment path from short-term no relationship. There is also no significant direct 
relationship.  Thus our observed  causal relationship between youth unemployment and 
labour regulation does not  withstand our further scrutiny through dynamic panel data 
analysis. At best we can conclude that there is no meaningful relationship between youth 
unemployment and various aspects of labour regulation. 
 
 
 
                                                            
2
  We have considered a uniform lag-structure for all the countries, as the STATA ado used here does not have 
this option. It is theoretically possible to consider different lag structures for different countries on the basis of 
some information criteria.  
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper examines various aspects of labour law and its unemployment consequence for 
four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over a long time span 1970-2006. It 
supports the contention of the legal-origin theory that UK and USA (common law countries) 
intervene less in the labour market and grant less protection to their labourers. It also supports 
the proposition that the problem of unemployment is more acute in the civil law countries 
(France and Germany). But our Panel Granger Causality test finds no causal relationship 
between total or long-term unemployment and aggregate labour protection or its various 
components. Our study, however, finds a causal relationship between labour protection and 
youth unemployment.  
 
For further investigation we have fitted alternative dynamic panel data models. In none of the 
models, we find a short-term relationship and a stable adjustment path leading to a long-term 
relationship (positive or negative) between aggregate labour protection, ALLAB or its 
various components and youth unemployment.  Hence, we conclude that the explanation of 
more acute unemployment problem in France and Germany should be sought elsewhere, not 
in their more protective labour law. This requires a separate study beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
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Table 1. Labour Protection in Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
                                                                                                                           (Period Averages) 
Period France Germany UK USA 
Common 
Law 
Civil 
Law 
 
Aggregate Labour Protection (ALLAB) 
  
1970-74 0.54 0.54 0.31 0.11 0.21 0.54 
1975-79 0.64 0.56 0.41 0.11 0.26 0.60 
1980-84 0.72 0.56 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.64 
1985-89 0.75 0.56 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.66 
1990-94 0.78 0.56 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.67 
1995-99 0.78 0.56 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.67 
2000-06 0.78 0.59 0.36 0.15 0.25 0.69 
 
Alternative Employment Contracts (AC) 
1970-74 0.43 0.70 0.08 0.25 0.16 0.56 
1975-79 0.44 0.72 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.58 
1980-84 0.73 0.72 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.73 
1985-89 0.82 0.75 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.78 
1990-94 0.93 0.75 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.84 
1995-99 0.93 0.72 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.83 
2000-06 0.93 0.77 0.52 0.25 0.38 0.85 
 
Regulation of Working Time (RT) 
1970-74 0.71 0.56 0.37 0.17 0.27 0.64 
1975-79 0.71 0.56 0.37 0.17 0.27 0.64 
1980-84 0.73 0.56 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.65 
1985-89 0.75 0.56 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.66 
1990-94 0.75 0.58 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.66 
1995-99 0.75 0.60 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.68 
2000-06 0.76 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.68 
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Table 1 (contd.) 
                                                                                                                           (Period Averages) 
Period France Germany UK USA 
Common 
Law 
Civil 
Law 
 
Regulation of Dismissal (RD) 
1970-74 0.36 0.42 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.39 
1975-79 0.78 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.21 0.61 
1980-84 0.78 0.43 0.41 0.00 0.21 0.61 
1985-89 0.76 0.43 0.39 0.03 0.21 0.59 
1990-94 0.75 0.43 0.41 0.17 0.29 0.59 
1995-99 0.75 0.44 0.42 0.17 0.29 0.60 
2000-06 0.75 0.52 0.43 0.17 0.30 0.63 
 
Employee Representation (ER)  
1970-74 0.38 0.65 0.41 0.04 0.22 0.51 
1975-79 0.38 0.68 0.56 0.04 0.30 0.53 
1980-84 0.49 0.69 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.59 
1985-89 0.60 0.69 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.65 
1990-94 0.61 0.69 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.65 
1995-99 0.61 0.69 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.65 
2000-06 0.61 0.69 0.29 0.04 0.17 0.65 
 
Industrial Action (IA) 
1970-74 0.81 0.43 0.46 0.11 0.29 0.62 
1975-79 0.81 0.45 0.56 0.11 0.34 0.63 
1980-84 0.82 0.46 0.44 0.11 0.28 0.64 
1985-89 0.83 0.42 0.33 0.11 0.22 0.63 
1990-94 0.83 0.41 0.29 0.11 0.20 0.62 
1995-99 0.83 0.41 0.22 0.11 0.17 0.62 
2000-06 0.83 0.41 0.33 0.11 0.22 0.62 
============================================================ 
Source: Calculated from CBR (University of Cambridge) data available in 
See 〈http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm〉. 
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Table 2. Unemployment Problems in the Common Law vis-à-vis the Civil Law 
Countries since the 1970s: Dummy Variable Analysis1 
 
Series 
& 
Period of Analysis 
Intercept 
(a) 
Dummy for 
Common Law 
Countries (COM) 
Time Trend 
(t) 
R-Square 
Rate of unemployment 
as percentage of 
civilian labour force 
(TU), 
1970-2006 
4.678* -.451 0.117* 0.233 
Long-term 
unemployment (more 
than one year) as 
percentage of total 
unemployment, LU, 
1970-2006 
32.429* -22.432* 0.407* 0.526 
Youth unemployment 
as percentage of total 
labour force in the age 
group 15-24, YU, 
1980-2006 
 
22.16* -4.579* -0.184* 0.212 
 
* Significant at 1 per cent level (based on robust standard errors).  
1 The following regression equation has been fitted through OLS: 
Y = a + b.COM +d.t  
where Y is the alternative rates of unemployment (alternatively TU, LU and YU are used), 
COM is the dummy variable = 1 for common law countries (UK, USA) and zero for other 
countries (France and Germany), , t is the time trend. 
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Table 3 
Relationships among Shareholder/Creditor Protection, Financial Development 
Indicators and Real GDP per capita for the Panel of Four OECD Countries, 1970-
2005/6: Panel VAR Granger Causality Tests 
 
Dependent 
Variable1: 
Unemployment 
Rates 
(Chosen Lag) 
Excluded 
Variable1 
Chi-
Square 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable1: 
Legal 
Index 
(Chosen 
Lag) 
Excluded 
Variable1 
Chi-
Square 
 Labour 
Protection and  
Unemployment  
Relationship, 
1970-2006   
 
  
1. TU      
(3) 
  
ALLAB 
(3)   
 ALLAB  5.496553  TU  1.052167 
 LPPPCY  12.79039*  LPPPCY  1.502513 
(3)   AC(3)   
 AC  1.646706  TU  0.648205 
 LPPPCY  19.14172*  LPPPCY  1.207264 
(3)   RT(3)   
 RT  6.155376  TU  1.526474 
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 LPPPCY  12.47433*  LPPPCY  1.904135 
(3)   RD(3)   
 RD  2.116034  TU  5.024368 
 LPPPCY  17.41519*  LPPPCY  3.238427 
(3)   ER(3)   
 ER  4.570485  TU  0.392825 
 LPPPCY  13.15655*  LPPPCY  0.590824 
(3)   IA(3)   
 IA  5.986007  TU  3.770924 
 LPPPCY  15.78583  LPPPCY  4.807193 
2. LU      
(3)   ALLAB(3)   
 ALLAB  4.163131  LU  0.739685 
 LPPPCY  41.71841*  LPPPCY  0.340534 
(3)   AC(3)   
 AC  2.541290  LU  1.090495 
 LPPPCY  43.54637*  LPPPCY  0.966725 
(3)   RT(3)   
 RT  3.109167  LU  1.753197 
 LPPPCY  42.73955*  LPPPCY  0.423113 
(3)   RD(3)   
 RD  1.959890  LU  2.137263 
 LPPPCY  43.29744*  LPPPCY  0.439976 
(3)   ER(3)   
 ER  4.872341  LU  0.178116 
 LPPPCY  42.49070*  LPPPCY  1.583125 
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(3)   IA(3)   
 IA  4.232264  LU  1.079272 
 LPPPCY  44.54007*  LPPPCY  2.572257 
3. YU2      
(3)   ALLAB(3)   
 ALLAB  17.42836*  YU  3.337184 
 LPPPCY  13.86859*  LPPPCY  0.213086 
(3)   AC(3)   
 AC  15.54773*  YU  4.244843 
 LPPPCY  15.91625*  LPPPCY  0.452868 
(3)   RT(3)   
 RT  4.849581  YU  0.184572 
 LPPPCY  12.11379*  LPPPCY  0.536805 
(3)   RD(3)   
 RD  8.874716*  YU  2.791170 
 LPPPCY  12.04907*  LPPPCY  2.244738 
(3)   ER(3)   
 ER  11.93928*  YU  0.310233 
 LPPPCY  16.88912*  LPPPCY  0.713262 
(3)   IA(3)   
 IA  10.49854*  YU  1.041089 
 LPPPCY  11.36673*  LPPPCY  3.416997 
 
* Null hypothesis of no causality is rejected at 5 % level. 
1 ALLAB is Aggregate Labour Protection; 
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AC is Alternative Employment Contracts; 
RT is Regulation of Working Time; 
RD is Regulation of Dismissal;  
ER is Employee Representation;  
IA is Industrial Action; 
TU is the rate of unemployment as percentage of civilian labour force; 
LU is long-term unemployment (more than one year) as percentage of total unemployment; 
YU is youth unemployment as percentage of total labor force in the age group 15-24. 
2 The period of analysis is 1980-2006.  
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Table 4 
Short-run and Long-run Relationships between Youth Unemployment Rate and  
Labour Protection Index, 1980-2006: Alternative Dynamic Panel Models 
Models  
&  
Regressors
1
 
 
PMG Model MG Model DFE Model 
1. Aggregate Labour 
Protection Index(Z)-Youth 
Unemployment (X) 
Relationship 
   
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) -5.343 14.809 -18.438 
Z (ALLLAB) -23.623** -153.978 47.092 
Short-term Relationship    
θ 0.094 0.094 -0.133* 
∆Xt-1 -0.113 -0.221*** 0.06 
∆Yt -65.753*** -60.059*** -54.572*** 
∆Yt-1 -57.141*** -59.397** -32.046** 
∆Zt -5.685 -13.374 0.064 
µ -3.526 27.019 25.859* 
Chosen Model2   DFE 
2.Labour 
Protection Index relating to 
Alternative Employment 
Contracts-(Z)-Youth 
Unemployment(X)  
   
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) -296.32 -6.618 -20.082 
Z (AC) 305.696 33.225 28.994 
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Short-term Relationship    
θ -0.008 -0.065 -0.125* 
∆Xt-1 0.004 0.025 0.046 
∆Yt -62.501*** -54.454*** -55.115*** 
∆Yt-1 -51.008** -47.284 -33.037*** 
∆Zt -3.222 -7.744 0.787 
µ 23.927 2.767 27.124 
Chosen Model2   DFE 
3.Labour 
Protection Index relating to 
Regulation of Working Time 
(Z)-Youth 
Unemployment(X) 
Relationship 
   
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) -5.055 -10.931** -10.605 
Z (RT) -16.373*** -79.292 6.412 
Short-term Relationship    
θ 0.118 0.173 -0.153** 
∆Xt-1 -0.129 -0.219*** 0.082 
∆Yt -68.314*** -74.309*** -53.806*** 
∆Yt-1 -56.896*** -57.317*** -31.027** 
∆Zt -4.289 6.371 -4.694 
µ -4.213 16.48 20.015 
Chosen Model
2
 
  DFE 
4.Labour 
Protection Index relating to 
Regulation of Dismissal (Z)-
Youth Unemployment(X) 
Relationship 
   
 Long-term Relationship     
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Y (LPPPCY) -426.149 137.911 -13.029 
Z (RD) 2754.312 -1271.509 17.374 
Short-term Relationship    
θ -0.003 0.081 -0.141** 
∆Xt-1 -0.091 -0.216*** 0.072 
∆Yt -59.994*** -65.371*** -55.375*** 
∆Yt-1 -57.202** -62.941** -31.415** 
∆Zt 27.959 24.68 5.476 
µ 6.835 23.85 21.392* 
Chosen Model2   DFE 
5.Labour 
Protection Index relating to 
Employee Representation (Z)-
Youth Unemployment(X) 
Relationship  
   
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) -10.699*** -18.138** -10.014 
Z (ER) -16.119* -195.589 5.983 
Short-term Relationship    
θ 0.053 0.099 -0.165** 
∆Xt-1 -0.093 -0.176 0.094 
∆Yt -63.345*** -67.834*** -53.421*** 
∆Yt-1 -56.69*** -65.581** -31.058** 
∆Zt -3.626* -4.268* -2.722 
µ -3.449 0.891 20.588* 
Chosen Model2 PMG   
6.Labour 
Protection Index relating to 
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Industrial Action (Z)-Youth 
Unemployment(X) 
Relationship 
 Long-term Relationship     
Y (LPPPCY) -33.945 -20.421** -8.632 
Z (IA) 8.309 -1.299 -26.331 
Short-term Relationship    
θ 0.008 0.071 -0.167*** 
∆Xt-1 -0.052 -0.099 0.084 
∆Yt -61.098*** -67.171*** -54.757*** 
∆Yt-1 -51.397** -55.494** -30.262** 
∆Zt -11.722 -10.37 -4.851 
µ -0.547 -1.514 20.632* 
Chosen Model2   DFE 
 
*  Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
1 The regressors are estimated from the following long-term relationship and its error 
correction form. 
Long-run Relationship: 
Xit = ψi Yit + pii Zit   + η it 
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where i (=1,2,3,4) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents periods (years), ψi and pii   
are the long-run parameters and  ηit is the error term. 
 
It’s Error Correction Form: 
                                                 p-1                    q-1                         r-1       
(3) ∆Xit = θi(η it-1) +   Σλij ∆Xi, t-j + Σψ ik ∆Y i, t-k + Σpiil ∆Zi, t-l + µi +  φit                
                                                 j = 1                  k  =  0                      l = 0 
 
 where ∆ is the difference operator, θi is the group-specific error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term, λij, ψik  and piij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µi  is the 
country fixed effect and φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run 
relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. 
                                                               
                                      
2 An appropriate model is chosen on the basis of a series of Hausman tests. 
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Figure 1 
Labour Protection in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-06
France Germany UK USA
 30 
 
Figure 2 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection, 1970-2006 
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Figure 3 
Labour Protection relating to Employment Contract in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 4 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection Relating to Employment Contract, 1970-2006 
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Figure 5 
Labour Protection Relating to Regulation of Working Time in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 6 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection Relating to Regulation of Working Time, 1970-2006 
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Figure 7 
Labour Protection Relating to Regulation of Dismissal in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 8 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection Relating to Regulation of Dismissal, 1970-2006 
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Figure 9 
Labour Protection Relating to Employee Representation in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 10 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection Relating to Employee Representation, 1970-2006 
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Figure 11 
Labour Protection Relating to Industrial Action in 
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 12 
Common Law vs. Civil Law: 
Labour Protection Relating to Industrial Action, 1970-2006 
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 Figure 13 
Rate of Unemployment as Percentage of Civilian Labour Force in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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 Figure 14 
Long-term Unemployment as Percentage of Total Unemployment in  
Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 15 
Youth unemployment as Percentage of Total Labor Force Aged 15-24 in  
Four OECD Countries, 1980-2006 
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